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ABSTRACT:  Experimental studies of two-person sequential bargaining demonstrate that the concept
of subgame perfection is not a reliable point predictor of actual behavior.  Alternative explanations
argue that 1) fairness influences outcomes and 2) that bargainer expectations matter and are likely not
to be coordinated at the outset.  This paper examines the process by which bargainers in two-person
dyads coordinate their expectations on a bargaining convention and how this convention is supported
by the seemingly empty threat of rejecting positive but small subgame perfect offers.  To organize the
data from this experiment, we develop a Markov model of adaptive expectations and bounded
rationality.  The model predicts actual behavior quite closely.   
JEL CLASSIFICATION NUMBERS: C72, C78, C91, D84
KEYWORDS: Sequential Bargaining, Experiment, Convention, Fairness, Finite Markov Chain,
Bounded Rationality
* I am grateful to Herbert Gintis, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith for their comments on the experimental
design.  I would also like to thank Sam Bowles, Corinna Noelke, John Stranlund, and Dale Stahl.  This project is
funded by the National Science Foundation (SBR 9730332 and SES-CAREER 0092953).Bargaining Outcomes                      2
1For a review of the ultimatum game see Camerer and Thaler [1995].  For sequential bargaining studies see Gueth
and Tietz [1988], Neelin, Sonnenschein and Spiegel [1988], or Ochs and Roth [1989].
2For experimental studies of backward induction see McKelvey and Palfrey [1992].  See Nagel [1995] and Ho,
Camerer and Weigelt [1998] on iterative dominance. 
3Roth and Schoumaker [1983] demonstrate the importance of expectations in determining bargaining outcomes in
an experiment using a two-stage version of the Nash demand game.  Additionally, Harrison and McCabe [1996]
demonstrate that, with exposure to subgame perfect play, subjects eventually coordinate on the SGPE.  For other
experimental studies where expectations are found to be important see Ochs [1995] on coordination problems and
Sunder [1995] on speculative asset market bubbles.
If the phenomenon of “rational agreement” is fundamentally psychic - convergence
of expectations - there is no presumption that mathematical game theory is essential
to the process of reaching agreement, hence no basis for presuming that
mathematics is a main source of inspiration in the convergence process. (Schelling
[1960], pp.114)
1I NTRODUCTION
Experimental studies of two-person sequential bargaining have documented two
behavioral regularities - subjects do not end up in subgame perfect equilibria
(SGPE), even with experience, and observed outcomes typically diverge from the
SGPE toward an equal split of the surplus.
1  Concentrating for now on the first
result, it is clear that subgame perfection can only be supported if bargainers use
SGPE strategies and expect that their opponents will also use the SGPE strategy.  In
this sense, subgame perfection requires common knowledge of the ability to do
backward induction.  Experiments have been conducted that indirectly test if
subgame perfection is behaviorally important by analyzing whether subjects make
backward induction calculations to inform decisions.  These studies find little
support for a general capacity to do multiple levels of backward induction or iterative
dominance.
2   As such, it is unlikely that the key to understanding how subjects
reason in sequential bargaining lies in the mechanics of backward induction.
On the other hand, expectations have proven to go a long way in explaining
behavior.
3 Experiments that analyze expectations demonstrate that two agents will be
able to maintain an efficient (conflict minimizing) convention only when they come
to anticipate the response of their partner.  In situations such as in the experimental
lab that are devoid of the kind of social history that establishes prevailing behavioral
conventions, subjects are likely to initially rely on social heuristics.  Social heuristics
are general behavioral rules developed outside the lab which, presumably, are shared
by all participants from a common culture (Roth et al. [1991], Henrich [2000], and
Henrich et al. [2001]).  In this way, subjects rely on heuristic rules as a benchmark
from which they explore alternative strategies within the setting of the experiment.
The exploration process consists mainly of forming expectations about the future
success of various strategies based on what has worked previously in the current
population of bargaining partners.  Put another way, bargaining conventions, and
adaptive social norms in general, are important, not necessarily because they dictate
behavior, but because they coordinate agents’ expectations. This paper explores howBargaining Outcomes                      3
4Such a simple theory can explain behavioral changes such as those documented in Prasnikar and Roth [1992] which
highlight the difference in behavior when the off-perfect equilibrium incentives are changed from the ultimatum
game where more generous proposers are rewarded to the best-shot game where generous first movers are taken
advantage of.
the initial expectations of subjects formed early in bargaining can evolve into a
convention.
Returning to the stylized fact that bargaining surpluses tend to be split
equally, two theories that predict the equal split find empirical support.  One theory
states that bargainers who are placed in context-free laboratory rely on social
heuristics founded in equity norms in one-shot games.  A second theory predicts that
bargainers make ‘fair’ offers because they are sure such offers will be accepted. A
naive version of the first theory predicts that bargainers will maintain the
expectations they bring to the lab which implicitly are that the surplus should be split
equally.  The second theory emphasizes the idea that subjects must experience the
game and its incentive structure to form the expectations that will dictate which offer
maximizes expected payoff.
Carpenter [2000] finds support for both theories, but more importantly for
the current discussion, the results demonstrate that only egoists (those who behave
as payoff maximizers) use expectations about their opponent’s social orientation (e.g.
altruistic) to inform proposing decisions.  This supports a theory of bargaining
outcomes (conventions) wherein some agents enter the lab with preexisting
expectations of how to divide a pie, and others start with a blank slate, but form
expectations in the process of bargaining.  As such, conventions that develop in this
setting are likely to be skewed toward the behavior of those who don’t deviate from
the heuristic rules they bring to the lab.  The end result is a hybrid in the sense that
participants with particularly salient heuristics dictate the benchmark and those who
try various strategies to find one that maximizes payoffs cause the resulting
convention to drift away from the benchmark.  Additionally, it is reasonable to think
that the amount of drift will be a function of the off-perfect equilibrium incentives of
the bargaining institution.
4
This paper reports on a repeated sequential bargaining experiment that
supports this theory of bargaining conventions.  A brief summary of the results is as
follows.  To begin, subgame perfection is not supported as a predictor of outcomes.
Rather, a convention develops in the early stages of bargaining (despite various
treatment conditions that alter the strategic incentives of the game) wherein the
bargainer making a proposal gets 55% of the current pie.  This convention is
supported by the theoretically incredible threat to reject subgame perfect offers.
Further, a model of adaptive expectations does well to explain the evolution of this
convention, given the starting distribution of bargaining strategies.
2T HE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment described below is essentially a simplification of the design used by
Harrison and McCabe [1992].  The Harrison and McCabe design gives subjectsBargaining Outcomes                      4
    The Bargaining Institution
repeated experience in both a three-stage sequential bargaining game and the two-
stage subgame of the larger game.  This design is used to show that experience in the
subgame is enough to coordinate the expectations of subjects in a way that mimics
the notion of common knowledge mentioned above.  Given this design, the authors
find support for subgame perfection as the limiting outcome when subjects gain
sufficient experience, and therefore, have coordinated their expectations.  
The current experiment exploits the elements of the Harrison & McCabe
design that are useful for examining expectations (i.e. repeated experience in the
subgame), but takes cues from experiments that have been run which demonstrate
that experimenters should not expect subjects to accomplish more than two levels of
backward induction (see footnote 2).  To account for this stylized fact, the current
experiment is a simplified (one and two round) version of the earlier study to assure
subgame perfection is given a fair chance of working.  Figure 1 summarizes the
repeated sequential bargaining environment that subjects faced.Bargaining Outcomes                      5
5Notice that even repeated bargaining between players matched with the same partner for the duration of the game
cannot support any other Nash equilibrium.  For example an early rejection by either one or two can only sustain
a more favorable series of future proposals if the other player is uncertain about the preferences of the rejector.  The
assumption of common knowledge guarantees that any rejection is treated as a mistake and therefore the SGPE
prediction is also robust with respect to ‘trembling hands.’  In addition, the game is finitely repeated which precludes
any folk theorem results.
Subjects were randomly assigned to roles as either player one or player two.
There were 15 periods of bargaining.  All the odd periods were one-round ultimatum
games and all the even periods were two-round games. In periods 1,3,...15 player two
proposed a division, X, of a pie of size 10* where 0<*<1 (in the experiment *=.25
or .75).  Next, player one decided to either accept or reject this proposal.  If the
proposal was accepted, player one received X and player two received 10*-X.  If the
proposal was rejected, both players received 0 for the period.  
In periods 2,4,...14 player one made an opening offer over a pie that was
initially 10 experimental francs.  If player two accepted player one’s proposal, the
period was over, player two received X and 10-X went to player one.  However, if
player two rejected player one’s round one proposal, then the two subjects moved to
round two - the subgame - and the pie shrank to 10*.  By design, the resulting
subgame was identical to the ultimatum game played in odd periods.
All participants were given a worksheet to assure that they understood the
structure of bargaining.  The worksheet required subjects to keep record of
proposals sent, received and responses made for each period.  As a result, the
worksheet clearly laid out the structure of bargaining and therefore reinforced the
consequences of moving to the subgame.  Also, by filling out the worksheet, each
subject had in front of him or her a complete history of prior proposals and
responses.  This was done to facilitate strategic thinking and give subgame perfection
it’s best shot.
The subgame perfect equilibrium for each period is calculated with the help
of Figure 1.  Start with the subgame played in each odd period.  In addition, assume
that bargainers have standard preferences for monetary outcomes and have common
expectations that everyone else has similar preferences, then the SGPE outcome
occurs where two offers one the smallest unit of account, ,, and one accepts because
, is better than nothing.  This is true for each odd period and thus forms the
expectation of what is likely to occur if bargaining in even periods moves to the
subgame.  Given this expectation about subgame play, in even periods one will offer
two what two expects to receive if bargaining moves to the second round, namely
10*.  Faced with this offer, two accepts as she cannot possibly do better by rejecting
and forcing the interaction to round 2.  This pattern will repeat itself regardless of
how subjects are matched.
5
This bargaining environment was chosen for two reasons.  First, repeated
bargaining is used because it provides the kind of experience that might lead subjects
to eventually experiment in the direction of the SGPE.  Secondly, this institutionBargaining Outcomes                      6
6Remember player two is expected to receive the lion’s share of the subgame (ultimatum game) pie.  Hence, as *
increases player two is the expected beneficiary.
7The preference revelation mechanism was essentially a series of bilateral dictator allocation decisions with variable
pie sizes.  Participants didn’t know the outcome of the preference exercise until the end of the experiment  For a
more in depth analysis of the Arizona experiments see Carpenter [2000].
forces subjects, who otherwise would tend to settle in round one of the two-stage
game, through the subgame.  The reasoning behind this follows Harrison and
McCabe [1992] who posit that pairs of subjects that agree in the first round of a
sequential game do not necessarily have common expectations about acceptable
outcomes because of a lack of experience in the subgame.  Without subgame
experience, these subjects have no way of forming expectations about what they will
get out of the second round. 
Matching Rule
Same Pairing Random Repairing
Discount
Factor
*=0.25 sessions 1, 2, 3
15 bargaining pairs
sessions 8, 9, 10
17 bargaining pairs
*=0.75 sessions 4, 5, 6, 7
17 bargaining pairs
sessions 11, 12, 13
16 bargaining pairs
   Table 1 Experimental Design
Within the experiment two treatment variables were manipulated: the degree
to which the pie shrank in the bargaining game, *, and the rule that matched
bargainers at the beginning of each period.  Table 1 summarizes the design.  For half
of the sessions the discount factor was .25 favoring player one and for the other half
the discount factor was .75 favoring player two.
6  Also for half the sessions subjects
were matched with the same partner for all fifteen periods and for the other half,
subjects were randomly rematched at the beginning of each period.  The matching
rule was explicitly mentioned in the instructions. 
3E XPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A total of 13 sessions were run using undergraduate subjects at the University of
Massachusetts.  The entire experiment (from instructions to payment) lasted slightly
less than an hour and the average earnings of a subject, including a five dollar show-
up fee, was $14.43.  To increase the number of pairs in each cell, the current results
were pooled with those of a series of experiments run at the University of Arizona.
There are two main differences in the experiments.  The Arizona experiments were
preceded by a preference revelation mechanism and were run for only 10 periods.
7
However, t-tests of mean behavior and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of distributional
differences did not suggest that behavior was significantly different betweenBargaining Outcomes                      7
8All tests were two-tailed and no differences were found at the 5% level.
9For all ultimatum games the SGPE is zero, for *=.25 the first round prediction is 2.50F, and for *=.75, the
prediction is 7.50F.
experiments.  After pooling the data, there are 27 (*=.25, same) pairs, 34 (*=.25,
random) pairs, 34 (*=.75, same) pairs, and 31 (*=.75, random) pairs for each of the
first 10 periods, and the numbers listed in Table 1 for periods 11 through 15.
The most striking feature of the data is how stationary proposals are in both
the ultimatum games and the two-stage games over time.  Standard t-tests indicate
that mean first period proposals are not significantly different from last period
proposals for any of the eight sequences.
8  To illustrate this point Figure 2 plots the
amount offered in the first round of the two-stage game played in even periods and
proposals made in the ultimatum game played in odd periods and for each cell of the
design.  Open circles indicate average offers and the lines above and below indicate
plus and minus one standard deviation.  Further, solid horizontal lines indicate an
even split of the surplus and dashed lines mark the SGPE predictions.
9
Clearly these results are at odds with Harrison and McCabe [1992].  While
Harrison and McCabe find that proposals steadily converge towards the subgame
perfect prediction over the course of fourteen periods, our results, using a much
simpler version of the game, show no movement in that direction.  Two differences
in the experiments may account for this difference.  First, in the more complicated
Harrison and McCabe game, the theoretical prediction in the two-stage subgame
overlapped with an equal split of the surplus.  This feature of the design might have
made the theorized subgame result more salient in the minds of the participants
compared to the very unequal theoretical outcome in the subgame of the current
experiment (recall the subgame of the current experiment is an ultimatum game).  If
this was true, then it may have been easier for the majority of participants to form a
common expectation about what would occur in the subgame.  However, this
explanation is somewhat unsatisfactory because it is reasonable to think that subjects
who rely on fairness to coordinate expectations in the two-round subgame would
also do so when making offers in the three round game.  An alternative explanation
might have something to do with the worksheet that participants filled out during the
current experiment.  Instead of eliciting strategic behavior by stressing the structure
of play and the consequences of rejecting an initial offer, the worksheet might have
reinforced fair play because participants often looked at a history of fair offers when
recording their responses.
Although the current results differ from Harrison and McCabe [1992], it
would be a mistake to conclude that expectations do not matter.  Instead, the
difference in these two experiments only questions whether strict fairness norms (i.e.
the equal split) can easily be displaced by experience. As we will show below,
expectations might also account for the current results.  In the next section we build
a model to argue that proposers quickly formed expectations that were maintained
over the course of the experiment and that these expectations did not driveBargaining Outcomes                      8
10One-tailed t-tests reject the hypothesis that any sequence approached subgame perfection.
11In all but two instances (*=.25, same - ultimatum) and (*=.25, random - ultimatum), one-tailed t-tests demonstrate
that offers, pooled across periods, are significantly below the equal split even though in many instances the equal split
is continuously within one standard deviation of the mean.
12The reason that the amount of DACs is lower in the current study is probably because of the discount factors used.
Virtually all counterproposals in the *=.25 sessions are disadvantageous. However, many of the *=.75
counterproposals are not disadvantageous because by rejecting a low offer in round one, a player can still receive a
substantial amount in round two.  By comparison, Ochs and Roth [1989] used *s of .4 and .6.
proposals to the levels predicted by subgame perfection nor did they reflect strict
fairness.
10  Instead, we see the following hybrid - offers hover just below the equal
split reflecting a slight advantage for the proposer.
11  This result is true for both the
one-stage ultimatum games and the two-stage shrinking pie games.
It appears that proposers are somewhat affected by the discount factor in the
two-stage game.  Returning to Figure 2, when * is .25 and player one (the initial
proposer) has the advantage, first round proposals are slightly less than when * is .75
and player two has the advantage.  This supports the hypothesis developed in (Gueth
and Tietz [1990]) that players one hide behind fairness and do not offer more than
half when the discount factor does not benefit them.  We will return to this below
when the treatment effects are analyzed more fully.  Overall, however, Figure 2
demonstrates that the results can be summarized by a convention wherein the
bargainer who is currently proposing gets 55% of the pie and the responder gets the
remainder.
{Figure 2 here}
Ochs and Roth [1989] coin the term disadvantageous counterproposals (DACs) for second
round proposals that leave the proposer with less than they would have gotten if they
had accepted the first round offer. They assert that this is an important phenomenon
because it describes 81 percent of the rejections found in their study and is also not
predicted by subgame perfection.  The results of the current experiment reveal a
substantial amount of DACs (36 percent) although not as many as in the Ochs &
Roth study.
12  Rejected offers, in relative terms so that the data could be pooled
across different values of *, and DACs that followed rejected offers are illustrated in
the left panel of Figure 3.
{Figure 3 here}
Figure 3 should be read as follows.  The darker region in both panels is a
histogram of offers (in relative terms) that were rejected.  The lighter region in the
left panel is a histogram of relative offers that were rejected and followed by DACs.
This panel illustrates the fact that a significant number of relatively fair offers are
rejected and followed by DACs.  The lighter region in the right panel is a histogram
of DACs but in relative terms (i.e. counterproposals that gave player two less in relativeBargaining Outcomes                      9
13Note, these results are consistent with many distribution and inequality based models of preferences.  Examples
include Fehr and Schmidt [1999], Bolton and Ockenfels [1999] and Falk and Fischbacher [1998].
14Counter proposals are not different from the ultimatum offers in the (*=.25, same) treatment (t=1.02, p=.15) nor
are they different from the (*=.25, random) treatment (t=1.41, p=.08).
15Here, counterproposals are marginally different from the (*=.75, random) treatment (t=-1.76, p=.04) and highly
significantly different from the (*=.75, same) treatment (t=-5.29, p=0).
terms than the first round proposal that was rejected). Bolton [1991] explains DACs
by arguing that subjects value both absolute and relative outcomes.  That is, a subject
may reject a round one proposal and counter by asking for less in absolute terms,
however the resulting counterproposal may give the proposer a larger share of the
smaller pie.  This explanation is supported by the right panel of Figure 3.  Here the
small lighter histogram illustrates the fact that only 2 of the 105 DACs are
disadvantageous in relative terms.  That is, in 98 percent of the cases subjects
rejected offers and countered by asking for more in relative terms.
An analysis of the actual counterproposals suggests two mechanisms that
support the evolution of the 55/45 convention.  As just mentioned, bargainers reject
offers that are small in relative terms and counter with proposals that ask for a larger
relative share.  However, how much more (in relative terms) do they ask for?
Basically, there are two types of counterproposals.  In the first case, player two
rejects a low first round offer and counters by returning to the 55/45 convention (i.e.
asks for 55% of the second round pie).  The second type escalates the aggressive
offer of player one by rejecting and responding with an even lower counteroffer.
This second type is sort of a tit-for-tat player who punishes departures from the
convention by escalating the deviation.  The first type simply returns to the
convention when deviations are encountered.
13
The size of the second round pie influences the distribution of these two
types of counterproposers in the population.  When the pie shrinks a lot between
round one and round two (*=.25), many more player twos respond to low proposals
by returning to the norm.  However, when the pie does not shrink much (*=.75),
more player twos escalate the deviation from the norm.  The treatment effect of * on
counterproposals is demonstrated in the left panel of Figure 4 (in Figures 4 and 5 the
first letter in the abbreviation stands for the matching rule, Same or Random, the
number corresponds to the discount factor, the abbreviation SR represents the first
round offer of the Ståhl-Rubinstein game played in all even periods and UG is
obvious).  In the *=.25 case we see that counterproposals are indistinguishable from
odd period ultimatum offers.
14  However when *=.75, counterproposals are on
average less than their odd period counterparts which suggests the escalation of low
offers in this case.
15
The heterogeneity in counterproposing behavior is better demonstrated in
the scatter plot in the right panel of Figure 4 which plots rejected offers in relative
terms against the fraction of the round two pie that was counterproposed.  Here we
see a large mass of data below the 45 degree line perhaps reflecting the inequalityBargaining Outcomes                      10
16For a general theory of inequality aversion see Fehr and Schmidt [1999].
17Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests show that the differences between the distributions of offers for both pairing
conditions are significant at any level.
18KS=.1545, p=.018.
aversion of some subjects.
16 Also note the mass of observations between the 40 and
50% counterproposal which illustrates those players who return to the convention.
However, we also see a considerable amount of tit-for-tat play to the northwest of
the 45 degree line.  
The last thing to notice about couterproposals is that they are more likely to
be rejected than first round proposals (34% of counters are rejected versus 21% of
first round proposals).  This observation also suggests that the punishment implicit
in a first round rejection is often escalated.  Controlling for offer size, pie size, and
the subject pairing rule, the following random effects logit regression shows that
offers are significantly (p<0.01) more likely to be accepted in the odd period
ultimatum games than in the second round of the even period Ståhl-Rubinstein
games.
Response (accept=1) = 0.75 + 2.01Offer - 0.78Pie - 0.20Pairing + 1.57UG




Turning to a discussion of the treatment effects, we see that varying the
discount factor has a strong effect on behavior while manipulating the matching rule
influences behavior to a lesser extent.  Figure 5 illustrates the differences between
treatments by plotting all eight sequences of average offers by period.  One can see
the striking difference in first round behavior between the *=.25 and *=.75
treatments (compare S25SR to S75SR and R25SR to R75SR).
17  Regardless of the
pairing rule, the average offers of the *=.75 treatment always lie above their *=.25
counterparts and continue to separate as the experiment progresses.  This
phenomenon further supports the idea that proposers push harder on the other
player when the discount factor favors them, but hide behind fairness when they are
in the theoretically disadvantaged position.
The pairing rule has less effect.  There were significant differences in
behavior in only two instances.  First and surprisingly, first round offers in the two-
round game (*=.75) were significantly higher when bargainers were randomly
repaired after every round than when bargainers stayed with the same partner for the
duration of the experiment.
18  Secondly, and as one would expect if repeat interaction
supports sharing, offers in the odd period ultimatum games where *=.75 were
significantly higher when bargainers were paired with the same partner for the entireBargaining Outcomes                      11
19KS=.2451, p=0.
20Note however, the resulting convention only moves in the direction of the SGPE in the case of the low discount
factor.  In the high discount factor treatments, the SPGE requires the proposer to offer more than half the pie in
two-round games.  This suggests that, instead of responding to the theoretical structure of the game, participants
associated bargaining power with the role of proposing.
experiment than when they were reshuffled after every period.
19  In the other two
cases (first-round proposals where *=.25, ultimatum proposals where *=.25) there
was no significant effect of the matching rule.
{Figure 5 here}
4C OORDINATED EXPECTATIONS AND BARGAINING OUTCOMES
The lack of variation in proposals across treatments with respect to time suggests
that subjects quickly agreed on a convention that guided proposing behavior.  This
convention, though obviously linked to fairness, evolved away from the equal split in
response to the institutional rules of the experiment.
20  Additionally, we have seen
that the rejection behavior of subjects works to support this convention by
punishing deviations from the established norm and by returning to it with
counterproposals.  However, as an explanation of the evolution of the 55/45
convention, it is still conjecture to say that the driving force is coordinated
expectations.  In this section, we will build and discuss a model of adaptive
expectations.  The purpose of the model is to illustrate how, given the initial
expectations of subjects and despite the fact that interaction occurred in dyads, the
most likely convention to evolve based on the decentralized flow of information
between subjects is the one observed - proposers get 55% of the pie.
The structure of the model is adapted from a discussion of the evolution of
conventions in Young [1993], Young [1998] and Gintis [2000].  More specifically, we
will first develop a deterministic model of adaptive expectations in which a pseudo-
Markov transition matrix is constructed based on best-reply dynamics applied to
initial expectations about the success of three particular proposing strategies. These
three strategies organize all of the first proposals made by participants.  For what
follows, bargaining conventions will be defined broadly as the states of the resulting
dynamic system which demonstrate the most attracting power.  In the initial model
conventions will simply be absorbing states.  When we complicate the model later
on, conventions in the resulting ergodic system will be the states in which the system
spends most of its time.
To begin with, we define three proposing strategies.  The first will be called
Low, L, and will be defined as making a proposal, x to your counterpart for less than
40% of the pie (i.e. L={x|x<.4(current pie)}). Notice that in the ultimatum game
(periods 1,3,...15) and in even periods when the discount factor is .25, the Low
proposing strategy includes behavior that would be expected from subjects offeringBargaining Outcomes                      12
21The payoffs in Figure 6 were calculated as the average payoff in period 1 (period 2) for player 2 (player 1) of the
encounters between player 2 who played L, H or C when matched with a player 1 who subsequently played L, H or
C on the next round and between player 1 who played L, H or C when matched with a player 2 who previously
played L, H or C on the round before.
the SGPE.  Considering first proposals across treatments (i.e. considering only
period one in the case of player twos and period two in the case of player ones) the
strategy L accounts for 17% of proposals.  The second strategy will be called Half,
H, which is played by proposing at least half the current pie to your opponent
(H={x|x$.5(current pie)}).  In the first two periods H was played by 49% of player
twos and by 47% of player ones.  Lastly, define the strategy C as the bargaining
convention where proposers get approximately 55% of the current pie (C =
{x|.4<x<.5 of the current pie}).  Strategy C was played by 36% of player ones and by
35% of player twos when making their first proposals.
Using these three strategies to organize the data on proposals for the first
two periods, we can calculate the average (and expected) payoff of each strategy.  We
use the data from the first two periods only because we are interested in how
behavior and expectations adapt to the results of initial play.  Figure 6 presents the
expected payoff to each strategy when it meets a proposer who makes a proposal of
either L, H or C.
21  The entries of Figure 6 are in relative terms.  We will continue to
speak in terms of relative proposals so that the data from all four cells can be pooled
and because the development of the observed convention appears to be independent
of the treatment conditions.
Define an expectational equilibrium as a Nash equilibrium of the game
played between prosposers where the payoffs are expressed as expectations.  Clearly,
for player one proposing half is dominated in expected payoff by playing the
convention.  Upon further examination, one can see that there are two expectational
equilibria based on play in the first two periods. Both are symmetric and occur where
all proposers coordinate on either proposing low or all play the convention.
Referring to the definition of Nash equilibria, it should be clear that the expectational
equilibria in Figure 6 will be absorbing states in our model of adaptive expectations.
In other words, once bargainers transit to one of the equilibrium states, LL or CC (to
be read Player one’s strategy, Player two’s strategy), their expectations will be
coordinated in that they have no incentive to play anything else.  The question then
becomes, which equilibrium are subjects most likely to end up at.Bargaining Outcomes                      13
Figure 6 Expected Payoff to Each Strategy
The dynamic we will use is best reply based on one period of recall.  Hence,
the transition matrix will be deterministic and not stochastic, but as a first step in the
analysis we are interested to see where best reply dynamics will drive the data.  More
specifically, we assume players only remember the last proposal they made and its
payoff.  Therefore, on average, the dynamics of the population of bargainers can be
represented by two agents who play their best reply based on the expected payoffs in
Figure 6 and their last encounter.  For example, because LL is an absorbing state, the
best reply for player one of ending up in the LL cell is to continue to play L, likewise
for player two. Similarly, the best reply of player one who’s last period outcome was
HH is to play C, while player two will stick with H.
We develop a pseudo-Markovian transition matrix for the current model by
calculating the probability of transiting from one state to another of the game
illustrated in Figure 6.  Because we use the simple best reply dynamic and because
none of the expected payoffs that need to be compared are equal, the transition
probabilities are either 0 or 1 (i.e. there is always a unique best reply to the stated
history).  Figure 7 presents the best reply transition matrix, E, that has been
constructed based on the expectations of subjects in the experiment as defined by
the average payoff from first proposals.Bargaining Outcomes                      14
Figure 7 Expectational Transition Matrix
Given we assume that expectations adapt according to the best reply dynamic
used to create E, the predicted distribution of states in the second period of the
experiment is calculated by multiplying the distribution of starting states, call it S0, by
the transition matrix, E.  Effectively, this calculates the best reply of the starting
population distribution to the expected payoffs of each strategy in the game depicted
in Figure 6.  Likewise, to calculate the expected distribution of states in period 3 we
would multiply S0 by E
2.  In general, to calculate the distribution of states after n
periods we find S0E
n.
Because the transition matrix has absorbing states (which conform to the
Nash equilibria of Figure 6), the process of expectation adaptation is likely to be
absorbed by either LL or CC.  The question that we are interested in is which state is
more likely to become a convention?  In other words, what is the long run behavior
of the system?  To examine limiting behavior of our model of expectation
coordination we calculate
In the present case, E
*=E
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As we see, if the best reply dynamic that underlies E represents the process
of expectation coordination, then those pairs which start in state LL will remain
there, and those starting in states LH and LC will be absorbed by state LC where
player one plays the convention and player two plays low.  Further, pairs starting in
states HL and Cl will be absorbed by CL and finally, pairs starting in states HH, HC,
CH or CC will converge on the convention observed in the data.
Returning to the data on proposals from periods 1 and 2 of the experiment,
we find that S0 = (.06, .06, .05, .06, .27, .13, .06, .12, .19).  Multiplying S0 by the long-
run steady state of the expectation adaptation process, E
* we have the predicted end
state distribution, Sn = (.06, 0, .11, 0, 0, 0, .12, 0, .71).  In other words, the model we
have developed predicts that 71 percent of subjects will be in dyads that play the
convention.  Overall, if the model accurately predicts the process of expectation
coordination, 82 percent of the bargainers will be playing the convention, 18 percent
will play Low and no one will play Half.
Now let’s compare the predicted distribution of bargaining strategies to the
actual end state of the experiment.  In period 14 players one were distributed as
follows: 16 percent Low, 31 percent Half, and 53 percent Convention.  In period 15
players two were distributed 25 percent playing Low, 25 percent playing Half and 50
percent playing the convention. On average, pooling ones and twos, we find 21
percent Low, 28 percent Half, and 51 percent played the convention.  Therefore,
while the model is not a bad predictor, it over-predicts the absorbing power of the
convention and under-predicts the attracting power of proposing half (i.e. it
underpredicts the resiliency of the expectations of players who subscribe to an equity
norm).
To try to understand the difference between the predicted distribution of
proposing strategies and the actual distribution, we can explore relaxing the
assumptions we have made about the dynamic that underlies the expectational
transition matrix, E.  In particular, it is obviously incorrect to assume that bargainersBargaining Outcomes                      16
can make best replies when they do not have the information to calculate the
expected payoffs for each cell of Figure 6.  Therefore, we can examine another more
boundedly rational dynamic.  Rather than assuming that agents make best replies to
their first proposals, we will now assume that they sometimes make errors because
they don’t know what the best reply is or they can’t identify it from their limited
sample of play.  That is, now let us assume that bargainers are only able to make best
replies (1-e) of the time and with probability, e, bargainers choose their second best
reply.  To justify this change, we might imagine that because players meet one
responder at a time they have not been exposed to enough responders to form the
payoff expectations inherent in Figure 6.  As a result, with imperfect information,
they are forced to make boundedly rational strategy choices.  For example, return to
Figure 6 where the best reply to ending in state HH for player one is to play C.  Now
if player one does not experience playing C against H, then the best reply is to stick
with H.  Transforming the matrix E by incorporating the probability, e of playing the
second best reply we get what we call the Second Best Reply transition matrix,
Because there is a positive probability of moving from any state to any other state
(not necessarily in one move), Ee is ergodic and we can calculate the predicted long-
run distribution directly by finding Ee
* where
The matrix Ee
* arises after seven iterations and is a 9 by 9 matrix of the same 9 row
vectors.  The expectational equilibrium of the second best reply dynamic is described
by this row vector.  The first thing to note is that Ee
* converges quickly as does E
*.
In fact, both matrices, remarkably, converge within the time frame of the experiment
(i.e. #15 time periods).  Figure 8 illustrates the equilibrium predicted distribution of
states for three levels of e.  It is clear from Figure 8 that the frequency of bargainersBargaining Outcomes                      17
Figure 8 Predicted vs. Actual State
Distributions
playing Half increases as e increases and therefore, as bargainers become more
boundedly rational they are more likely to continue playing Half.
As Figure 8 demonstrates, the model fits better as we relax the assumption that
bargainers play best responses to the expected payoff of the three strategies.  When
the probability that agents make second best responses rather than best responses is
.5, our model of coordinated expectations fits rather closely to the behavior observed
in the lab.  Summarizing, this suggests is that bargaining conventions may arise as
epiphenomenon of the actions of decentralized bargainers who make best responses
to available information given they may feel some gravity towards preexisting
heuristics.  Moreover, it is reasonable to think of bargainers as locally optimizing in
that they make best reply comparisons of current payoffs to the outcome of past
negotiations.  In the process of doing so, a convention arises that is founded on both
existing norms (e.g. fairness) and the coordinated expectations that evolve as a by-
product of making boundedly rational comparisons within a specific institution.
5D ISCUSSION
Figure 9 is a nice summary of the data generated by the current experiment.  Figure 9
reworks Figure 2 so that the vertical axis now measures relative proposals.  Plotting
relative proposals in both odd period ultimatum games and even period two-round
games on the same graph clearly illustrates the convention of the proposer
(regardless of player number) getting a little more than half.  The sequences of
proposals plotted in Figure 9 show that, regardless of the treatment variables whichBargaining Outcomes                      18
have a slight effect on the level of the convention, proposals are flat with respect to
time.  This regularity and the corresponding reduction of variance in proposals is
evidence that expectations have stabilized.  Also, the fact that relative proposals
overlap so tightly suggests that the convention resulting from coordinated
expectations is established in terms of the proposer’s share of the given pie, rather
than in absolute payoffs.
{Figure 9 here}
While Figure 9 illustrates that proposals have stabilized, for expectations to
be truly coordinated we would also anticipate that the rate of rejection would
diminish over the course of the experiment.  This would occur as participants started
to sort out an agreeable allocation for each role.  Figure 10 plots the rejection rates
for each role in the experiment.  The first thing to notice is that the rejection rates
for the two roles cycle starting relatively low, increasing and then falling again.  Also
notice the cycles are staggered by one period.  After player ones reject more (less)
player twos increase (decrease) their likelihood of rejecting in the next period.  The
path dependant nature of this cycle continues over the course of the experiment
demonstrating that spite might be affecting responses (recall the regression results).
If it is spite causing the cycles in responses, it also prevents the rejection rates from
systematically diminishing over time.  The figure leads to an interesting hypothesis
worthy of further study.  Namely, if bargainers coordinate their expectations about
who should get what in a particular bargaining institution, then we would expect that
by the end of a series of negotiations most offers would be accepted.  However, just
as general norms of fairness might influence the direction and speed of convergence
to a convention within a specific institution, spite might interfere and hinder the
process.  Here spite, triggered by having one’s last offer rejected, disrupts
convergence by causing bargainers to reject offers that might have otherwise been
acceptable.
{Figure 10 here}
Overall, the current results seem to be driven both by distributional concerns
and by expectations formed early in the game.  As a result, a nonadaptive, norm-
driven explanation such as that originally offered in Gueth, Schmittberger and
Schwarz [1982] can not fully explain these results because it does not predict the
slight but robust deviation from the equal split.  At the same time however, an
explanation based solely on eventually attaining common expectations which reflect
the strategic incentives built into the game are also unable to explain these results.
Such an approach can not account for the fact that in this experiment participants
never reach the SGPE as they did in Harrison and McCabe [1992].  Instead, both
explanations seem to be partially true.  Hence, a reasonably parsimonious model of
the current data would posit agents who enter the experiment with prior expectationsBargaining Outcomes                      19
22Note however, such a model would not necessarily predict that the resulting dynamic system would be driven
towards the SGPE.  Things such as the spite witnessed in the current experiment might prevent such convergence.
that are initially anchored to a distributional norm, but adapt to the current
institutional arrangement (i.e. the incentives and rules of the game) and the history of
play.
22
As a first attempt at creating such a model this paper has developed a simple
model of adaptive expectations that has been calibrated by the expected payoffs
faced by bargainers early in the experiment.  Overall, the model approximates the
behavior we see in the lab in that it predicts expectational equilibria that arise on a
time scale similar to the experiment length.  However, the fit was drastically
improved by weakening the assumptions underlying the best reply dynamic used.
The altered model allows for boundedly rational agents who make best replies to
available information.  The main contribution of the experiment and the analysis
presented herein is that we have provided evidence supporting the idea that, more
than the underlying logic of strategic interaction, initial conditions and expectations
based on the history of play are the driving force behind bargaining outcomes. 
Admittedly the model presented above is just a first attempt at creating a
dynamic explanation of bargaining conventions based on experimental data.  The list
of interesting extensions and modifications of the current model is long.  For
example, currently spite only enters the model by affecting the expected payoff of
making an offer.  Judging by Figure 10, the model might be improved by modeling
spite more systematically because the current method can not account for the
escalation-reduction cycles seen in the data.  In another rather expensive variation of
the current methodology one could abandon the best reply dynamics we have used
to motivate the adaptation process and run enough sessions to create a stochastic
transition matrix.  Here the matrix would be based on estimates of actually transiting
from one state to another.  Finally, one might also consider reworking the types of
errors that have been used to create drift in the model.  Currently, agents are
assumed to lack enough information to always find their best response, but another
reasonable approach would models errors that cause deviations both for
informational reasons and for preference reasons.  This might incorporate the
models of nonstandard preferences developed in Fehr and Schmidt [1999], Bolton
and Ockenfels [1999], Falk and Fischbacher [1998] or Rabin and Charness [1999].Bargaining Outcomes                      20
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osal, y and z are error bars, ___ indicates and equal split, and ...... indicates the SGPE.
Figure 2   Average First Round and Ultimatum Offers by Period (+/- one deviation)Bargaining Outcomes                      23
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Figure 3   Rejected Offers and Disadvantageous CounterproposalsBargaining Outcomes                      24
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Second Round Counter Proposals vs. Ultimatums
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Figure 9   Coordinated Expectations and Relative ProposalsBargaining Outcomes                      27






















Rejection Rates (pooled across treatments)
Player One Rejects
Player Two Rejects
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APPENDIX - INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS (random matching treatment)
This experiment is about two-person bargaining.  The experiment consists of 15
periods of bargaining between you and another player in the room.  All Participants
are currently reading the same instructions.  At the beginning of each period you will
be randomly matched with another player and therefore the likelihood of you being
paired with the same player twice is small.  You and the person you are matched with
will bargain over how to split a sum of Experimental Francs (F) called the 'PIE'.  The
exchange rate between Experimental Francs (F) and dollars is 1F equals 20 cents.
Each period consists of either 1 or 2 rounds.  All ODD periods contain only 1 round
and all EVEN periods contain 2 rounds.  A round consists of one party's making an
offer and the other party accepting or rejecting it.  Therefore, in ODD periods
(1,3,5,7,9,11,13,15) one party will make an offer and the other party will decide to
accept or reject the offer.  If the offer is accepted, your final payoff and the final
payoff of the other player will increase by the negotiated split of the pie.  If the offer
is rejected, then both you and the other player will receive 0 francs for this round.
Once the second party makes this decision we will wait until all other pairs of
subjects have made their choices and then move on to the next period.
All EVEN periods (2,4,6,8,10,12,14) consist of 2 rounds.  In the first round one
player will make an offer and the other will decide to accept or reject the offer.  If
this player accepts the offer you will move on to the next period.  If this player
rejects the offer, the second player will have the opportunity to make a
counterproposal in the second round.  In the second round, the player who has just
rejected an offer will make a counterproposal and the player who made the original
offer will be faced with the decision to accept or reject the counterproposal.
Additionally, in the second round the SIZE OF THE PIE WILL SHRINK.
Therefore, if bargaining in even periods moves to the second round then both
parties incur a penalty.  Once both players have made their choices in the second
round, we will wait for all the other participants and then move to the next period.
When bargaining begins, the half of the screen to the right of these instructions will
be filled with buttons, message boxes and information.  The message box at the top
of the screen will inform you whether you are to make an offer or to wait for an
offer.  Also this box will tell you the status of the offer you have sent to the person
you are paired with.  Below this box, are two boxes telling you what period and
round it is.  Below these boxes, is a frame that appears in yellow that displays the
offer that is being proposed to you.  You will see both, how much you will get and
how much the other player will get if you accept the offer.  You will notice that theBargaining Outcomes                      29
sum of what you get and what the other player gets always equals the current PIE
size.
The current pie size is always displayed below the offer frame.  In addition to the
current size of the pie, you will see information about the size of the pie last round
and next round (if there is a next round).
If the period is odd (1,3,5,7,9,11,13,15) then only this period’s pie will be displayed
because there is only one round in odd periods.  If the current period is even
(2,4,6,8,10,12,14) and it is ROUND ONE then you will see the size of the pie this
round and the size of the pie next round after accounting for the penalty.  If the
period is even and it is round two then you will see the current value of the pie and
the value of the pie last round.  When it is your turn to make a proposal to the other
player, you will see a MAKE PROPOSAL button, another message box and a
SEND PROPOSAL button.  The message box at the top of the screen will prompt
you to make a proposal.  To make a proposal, click on the MAKE PROPOSAL
button.  An input box appears asking you how much you would like to propose that
the other player gets.  You will enter an amount between 0 an the current pie size.
THIS IS THE AMOUNT THAT THE OTHER PLAYER WILL RECEIVE.
When you click OK, a message appears in the textbox to the right of the MAKE
PROPOSAL button that states the terms of the proposal you are offering.  If this is
what you want to propose, then send it to your partner by clicking SEND
PROPOSAL.  IF YOU WANT TO READJUST YOUR PROPOSAL, CLICK
THE MAKE PROPOSAL BUTTON AGAIN.  If you are in the position to receive
an offer in the current round, then you will be told to wait for the other player to
send a proposal.  When the proposal arrives, it will be displayed in the yellow frame
and the buttons to ACCEPT PROPOSAL or REJECT PROPOSAL will be
activated.  The text boxes next to these two buttons tell you the consequences of
accepting or rejecting an offer.  When the current period is even and it is round one,
if you reject a proposal then you will have the opportunity to make a
counterproposal over the pie displayed as 'Value of Pie NEXT ROUND'.  If you
accept any offer, you will move to the next period.
Your total payoff for the experiment will be the sum of all the francs that you
negotiate in the 15 periods.  You have been provided with a worksheet to keep track
of your earnings for this segment.  Please fill out the worksheet as bargaining
proceeds.  If you have any questions, please raise your hand now.  Otherwise, click
the FINISHED button to let us know that you have completed reading the
instructions.  Once bargaining has begun, IT IS VITAL THAT YOU MAKE YOURBargaining Outcomes                      30
DECISIONS SILENTLY.  A summary of the instructions will always appear in this
textbox once we have begun the bargaining.